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LAWYERING WITHIN THE
DOMAIN OF EXPERTISE
David McGowan*
INTRODUCTION
Suppose the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) drug approval process
was structured as criminal trials are structured and FDA lawyers embraced
the epistemology of such trials—who’s to say what is safe and effective?
That’s up to the jury. Would you feel better about the drugs you take?
Possibly you think the question absurd. You might say that the different
procedures have served different purposes and have been thought to
implicate different values. True enough, historically, but no rule of reason
makes it so. Technology, such as DNA matching, affects whether and how
to try criminal cases, and there is no reason to think the influence of
technology will lessen. The best approach to the question would be to
argue that we do not want drug approvals to resemble criminal trials, but
that nothing follows from this fact—which doesn’t answer the question.
So, would you feel better?
This Article uses the history of patent prosecution to assess the
relationship between the practice of law and the claim of an administrative
agency to possess and to employ expertise. By “expertise” I mean
knowledge and procedures supported by consensus sufficient to justify the
use of words like “fact” and “science.” Expertise is a premise of certain
types of regulation in the modern administrative state. It is essential to one
of the main promises of administration, which is that through rational
inquiry, we can learn the truth of the matter about some topic and then
regulate according to that truth. Expertise is more important to some forms
of regulation than to others, and it cannot answer all questions, but the
concept is useful when analyzing the roles lawyers play in the regulatory
state.
An initial qualification is in order and will be elaborated later. An
agency that promises to use expertise to get at the truth might not do so. It
might not have expertise in the first place; even if it does, it may bend to the
political winds rather than use it. My argument is different. It is that where
* Lyle L. Jones Professor of Competition and Innovation Law, University of San Diego
School of Law. My thanks to my colleagues at the University of San Diego, where I
presented this Article, and in particular to Ted Sichelman and Maimon Schwarzchild for
their helpfully skeptical comments. Any mistakes are my fault. This Article is part of a
larger colloquium entitled Lawyering in the Regulatory State held at Fordham University
School of Law. For an overview of the colloquium, see Nancy J. Moore, Foreword:
Lawyering in the Regulatory State, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2016).
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an agency claims expertise, that claim will lead it to give lawyers appearing
before it less leeway than lawyers generally have.
Agency officials claiming to exercise expertise need information to
which they may apply it. A patent examiner charged with deciding whether
a claimed invention is novel and nonobvious relative to the prior art needs
to know what that art includes. The FDA needs to know whether a drug is
safe and effective, and it requires data demonstrating these points. Within
the domain of expertise, therefore, firms and persons are subordinate to an
agency’s larger regulatory mission. Their role is largely to provide
information the experts need and, possibly after some argument, to do what
the experts say. An agency claiming expertise is likely to think lawyers
should subordinate their skills to its mission as well.
I. THE UNEVEN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
PATENT EXAMINATION AND EXPERTISE
Rule 56 of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) asserts that “[a] patent
by its very nature is affected with a public interest.”1 The rule imposes on
“[e]ach individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent
application” a “duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office,
which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that
individual to be material to patentability as defined in this section.”2 “Each
individual” includes “[e]ach attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes
the application.”3 The PTO’s more recently enacted Rule 11.106(b)(2)
permits lawyers to disclose confidential or privileged information to the
extent reasonably necessary to prevent a client from engaging in
“inequitable conduct” before the PTO.4
In contrast to the excessive notoriety surrounding the SEC’s SarbanesOxley Rules, the PTO’s Rule 56 has received comparatively little attention
since it was first adopted in 1977. The PTO’s broad rule of permissive
disclosure, adopted in the PTO’s 2013 revision of its rules, has received
even less. In part, this is because patent prosecution is ex parte, and there is
a plausible analogy between the PTO rules and the general principle that in
ex parte proceedings lawyers must disclose material facts.5 But PTO
practice long predates the American Bar Association Model Rules, and,
unlike ex parte practice in litigation, in the first instance, patent prosecution
is one-sided by design.
We begin with the experience that led to the adoption of the PTO rules.
As Jerry Mashaw has written, “[T]he first independent agency at the
national level was not the [Interstate Commerce Commission], but the

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2015).
Id.
Id. § 1.56(c)(2).
Id. § 11.106(b)(2).
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
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Patent Office, created ninety-seven years earlier,”6 and we can learn much
from its evolution.
A. Patents and Pigeonholes:
Strict but Informal Review from 1789 to 1793
Article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to
grant inventors, for a limited time, the exclusive right to their discoveries.7
The power to grant patents differs from some other forms of regulation—a
patent is something an inventor asks for, while many regulations are
imposed by agencies on the unwilling. Nevertheless, patents regulate
competition in making, using, and selling inventions, and it is their purpose
to do so.8
When the first Congress convened, aspiring patentees took the logical
step of petitioning Congress directly for an act granting exclusive rights.9
John Churchman was one aspirant; he averred that “by several years’ labor,
close application, and at great expense,” he had discovered magnetic means
for deriving longitude from a given latitude.10 He asked “that a law may
pass for vesting in the petitioner, his heirs and assigns, an exclusive right of
vending of spheres, hemispheres, maps, charts, and tables, on his principles
of magnetism, throughout the United States.”11
Congress acted decisively: it appointed a committee. Committee
members met with Churchman to hear about his invention. Churchman
brought a map and globe illustrating his ideas, and the committee was
impressed enough to recommend that he be granted exclusive rights.12
Congress was not going to appoint committees for every petition, though,
and it discovered the virtues of delegation in short order. It tabled
Churchman’s petition and drafted legislation to kick the patent problem to
the Executive.13
The 1790 Patent Act (“the 1790 Act”) created a board comprised of the
Attorney General and the Secretaries of State and War to review
applications, which would be granted with two of the three votes.14 The
relevant officials were Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Randolph, and General
6. Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law:
Federalist
Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1260 (2006).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
8. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Taking the Regulatory Nature of IP Seriously, 92
TEX. L. REV. 107 (2014).
9. See P.J. Federico, The First Patent Act, 14 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 237, 237–38 (1932).
10. Id. at 239.
11. H.R. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1789). He also sought “the patronage of
Congress to enable him to perform a voyage to Baffin’s Bay, for the purpose of making
magnetical experiments . . . .” Federico, supra note 9, at 239. This petition caused
congressional knees to jerk in different directions. James Madison, busily espousing strict
limitations on national power to oppose Hamilton’s financial plans, wanted to send
Churchman to Baffin Bay. Id. at 240.
12. Id. at 239–40.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE
HISTORY 136–37 (1948).
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Henry Knox.15 They called themselves the “Board of Arts”;16 others called
them the Patent Commission or Patent Board.17 The 1790 Act instructed
the board to grant patents only to petitions that claimed inventions the board
judged “sufficiently useful and important” to deserve a patent.18
This first move toward administration was modest, and procedures were
flexible.19 Petitions for patents were “noted in the minute book, in which
petitions are filed together in the desk up stairs in one of the pigeon holes
[sic].”20 Another pigeonhole held petitions decided and drafts of patents to
be issued. “Some of the specifications are in said desk, and others in the
closet.”21 The Board of Arts met monthly to read applications.22 The board
required applicants to submit specifications according to forms; applicants
with a lawyer used one form and applicants doing it themselves used
another.23 In doubtful cases, Jefferson decided whether a specification was
clear enough.24 Specifications were delivered to members of the Board of
Arts at home and were sent from one member to another as read.25
Administration was informal but hands-on. A letter from Jefferson to a
professor of chemistry at the University of Pennsylvania provides an
example:
Congress having referred to me a petition from a person of the name of
Isaacs, setting forth that he has discovered an easy method of rendering
sea-water potable, I have had a cask of sea-water procured, and the
petitioner has erected a small apparatus in my office, in order to exhibit
his process. Monday morning 10 [o’]clock is fixed on as the time for
doing it. It would give me great satisfaction to be assisted on the occasion
by your chemical knowledge . . . .26

Apart from the delightful vision of Jefferson spitting out unpurified
seawater in his office, this example reflects the informal and relatively ad
hoc nature of the early patent system. The need for expertise was acute, and
Jefferson knew as well as anyone that he was not qualified, and did not
15. KENNETH W. DOBYNS, THE PATENT OFFICE PONY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY PATENT
OFFICE 23 (1994).
16. Id.; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Knox (July 22, 1791), http://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-20-02-0307 [https://perma.cc/Q5CR-B7P4].
17. DOBYNS, supra note 15, at 23.
18. Patent Act of 1790, ch.7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109–12.
19. Further Memoranda from Henry Remsen, Jr. (1792), http://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Jefferson/01-17-02-0099-0010#TSJN-01-17-0136-fn-0001-ptr [https://perma.cc/
G29X-9YG9].
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Knox, supra note 16. Under the 1790
Act, these were due upon issuance of the grant; in the 1793 Act, they were due with the
application. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109–12; Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1
Stat. 318–23.
26. Letter from Sec’y of State to James Hutchison (Mar. 12, 1791), http://founders.
archives.gov/?q=potable%20Author%3A%22Jefferson%2C%20Thomas%22&s=111131111
3&sa=&r=3&sr= [https://perma.cc/8KCP-CBB8].
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have the time, to pass on every invention claimed in any field. In 1792,
Jefferson asked to be relieved from this duty.27
Under Jefferson’s leadership, the Board of Arts was said to have
“extremely high ideals as to the standard and dignity of the grant.”28 The
board reviewed applications rigorously and demanded proof that the
application specified an invention worthy of a patent.29 Disappointed
applicants had no right of appeal, so they were no happier than Jefferson.30
The system “was considered by the industrial classes to be inimical to their
welfare.”31 Given Jefferson’s own views, it seems too strong to say that
“the act of 1793 was passed at their instance,”32 but it does seem that both
sides of the application process were happy to see the end of the system put
in place by the 1790 Act.
The country’s first experience with patent grants yielded two lessons
relevant here. From the start, the procedures distinguished between
inventors represented by counsel and inventors prosecuting their own
applications. The advantages of counsel waned in the next period of
administration but were later revived and persist to this day. And
examination strained the patience and resources of administrators and
frustrated applicants. This tension, too, persists under all forms of
examination.
B. Registration:
The Cure for Strict Review Is No Review, 1793 to 1836
The 1793 Patent Act (“the 1793 Act”) allocated authority over patents to
the State Department but eliminated substantive review of petitions.
Section 3 of the Act required that inventors swear an oath that, to their
knowledge, they were the true inventor of the discoveries claimed in the
petition.33 Section 1 of the 1793 Act required novelty—that the petition
claim a “new and useful” invention, but absent examination enforcement of
this term rested on the oath.34 The 1793 Act is commonly said to have
instituted a system of registering rather than examining petitions.35
27. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Hugh Williamson (Apr. 1, 1792),
http://founders.archives.gov/?q=%22hugh%20williamson%22%20Author%3A%22Jefferson
%2C%20Thomas%22&s=1211311111&sa=&r=12&sr= [https://perma.cc/27E7-GNSF].
28. William I. Wyman, The Patent Act of 1836, 1 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 203, 203 (1918);
see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), http://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-06-02-0322 [https://perma.cc/9BTU-LXH8]. In this
letter, Jefferson states very modern conceptions of novelty and equivalence. Id.
29. See Wyman, supra note 28, at 203.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.; cf. Daniel Preston, The Administration and Reform of the U.S. Patent Office,
1790–1836, 5 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 331, 347 n.32 (1985) (arguing that inventors and
manufacturers were not influential in securing reforms of the deficiencies soon apparent
under the 1793 Act).
33. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318–23.
34. Id. § 1.
35. See The Patent Act of 1836, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 91 (1936). The 1793 Act said
only that it “shall and may be lawful” for the Secretary of State to issue patents to persons
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Both the 1790 and 1793 Acts required inventors to deliver written
descriptions and models of their inventions, but patent granting remained
informal. A vast bureaucracy it was not. Until 1802, all patent work was
performed by one clerk in the State Department, whose work did not fill
“over a dozen pigeonholes.”36 In 1802, Jefferson put William Thornton in
charge of patents.37 Thornton “exercised an autocratic control of the affairs
of the Patent Office” for the next twenty-six years.38
During this time, inventors commonly wrote their own petitions and
made their own models.39 Inventors who could not make the trip to
Washington sometimes gave their materials to legislators, who presented
them on behalf of their constituents.40 Thornton sought to help inventors
understand the paperwork that would be required to register their
inventions. In March 1811, he issued a pamphlet that must be among the
earliest American guides to administrative procedure.41 Thornton advised
prospective applicants to study prior art and consult experts if needed to
ensure the supposed invention would be practicable, provided a form for the
petition, described what the specification should do, emphasized the need
for specific drawings, and suggested that draftsmen sign their drawings so
future petitioners would know where to go for work that met the standards
of the office.42
Congressional indifference partly explains why Thornton ran the office
on his own terms. The 1793 Act did not create a separate patent office, so
Thornton was technically a State Department clerk. In 1818, Congress
approved a salary for a Superintendent of Patents, but it was lower than that
paid to other department heads.43 Thornton’s first clerk worked his first

who “shall allege” creation of a new and useful invention, Patent Act of 1793 § 1, but the
language was interpreted to make issuance essentially a matter of right subject to compliance
with form. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Frederick Guyer (Apr. 26, 1793),
http://founders.archives.gov/?q=patent%20Author%3A%22Jefferson%2C%20Thomas%22
&s=1111311113&r=62 [https://perma.cc/22DJ-UX99] (“I suppose it had escaped your
notice that that board was discontinued by the late Congress, and that the business of issuing
patents was referred to the department of state, from which they are given out as a matter of
right on the party’s complying with certain conditions required by the law.”). Sources
documenting the position that the office had no power to reject an application complying
with formal requirements are collected in John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System:
Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1071, 1125 n.214 (2000). The 1793 Act also provided for resolution of interfering
applications, a response to competing applications for steamboat technology under the 1790
Act. The Patent Act of 1793, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 77, 79 (1936).
36. George W. Evans, The Birth and Growth of the Patent Office, in 22 RECORDS OF THE
COLUMBIA HISTORICAL SOCIETY 105, 108 (John B. Larner ed., 1919).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Kara W. Swanson, The Emergence of the Professional Patent Practitioner, 50 TECH.
& CULTURE 519, 524 (2009).
40. Id.; Robert C. Post, “Liberalizers” Versus “Scientific Men” in the Antebellum
Patent Office, 17 TECH. & CULTURE 24, 29 n.14 (1976).
41. The pamphlet is reprinted in a note. See Patents, 6 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 97, 98 (1923).
42. Id. at 101–02.
43. Preston, supra note 32, at 335.
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year without pay and had to petition Congress for a salary.44 Thornton and
his wife sometimes copied out patents at their home in the evenings.45
Errors were sometimes made in patents and Thornton would correct them
for free, a fact that came to light when it was discovered that “[t]he
Department of State, the Patent Office, and the Treasury all had annual lists
of patents issued, all three were different, and none agreed with the annual
receipts.”46
The 1793 Act was an invitation to perfidy, piracy, and confusion. In a
letter to Isaac McPherson, famous today for its invocation of what we now
would call the theory of public goods, Jefferson lamented the abandonment
of expert review, even as limited as it had been under the 1790 Act, in favor
of the inexpert processes of litigation.
Referring to preissuance
examination, he wrote:
[I]nstead of refusing a patent in the first instance, as the board was
authorised to do, the patent now issues of course, subject to be declared
void on such principles as should be established by the courts of law.
[T]his business however is but little analogous to their course of reading,
since we might in vain turn over all the lubberly volumes of the law to
find a single ray which would lighten the path of the Mechanic or
Mathematician. [I]t is more within the information of a board of
Academical professors, and a previous refusal of patent would better
guard our citizens against harrassment [sic] by lawsuits. [B]ut England
had given it to her judges, and the usual predominancy of her examples
carried it to ours.47

Jefferson’s customary Anglophobia is on display here, but so is his
conviction, earned through practice as well as brilliance, that ex ante expert
review is preferable to the more capacious inquiries judges would allow in
court.
C. The 1836 Act and the Ideal of Expertise
Substantive examination occurred before 1836 but was irregular and
arguably inconsistent with the thrust of the 1793 Act.48 The Senate report
accompanying the bill that became the 1836 Act chronicled the deficiencies
of the registration approach:
1.

A considerable portion of all the patents granted are worthless
and void, as conflicting with, and infringing upon one another, or
upon, public rights . . . .

44. Id. at 336.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 339.
47. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 28.
48. S. DOC. NO. 24-338, at 3 (1836). The charge of inconsistency refers to Thornton’s
occasional refusal to register patents “in cases notoriously without merit.” Wyman, supra
note 28, at 210; see also Preston, supra note 32, at 343 (“[T]he secretary repeatedly told him
that no matter how correct his judgment of the worth of an application, the law required him
to issue the patent. Thornton never accepted this verdict.”).
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2.

The country becomes flooded with patent monopolies,
embarrassing to bona fide patentees, whose rights are thus
invaded on all sides; and not less embarrassing to the community
generally, in the use of even the most common machinery and
long-known improvements in the arts and common manufactures
of the country.

3.

Out of this interference and collision of patents and privileges, a
great number of lawsuits arise, which are daily increasing in an
alarming degree, onerous to the courts, ruinous to the parties, and
injurious to society.

4.

It opens the door to frauds, which have already become extensive
and serious. It is represented to the committee that it is not
uncommon for persons to copy patented machines in the modelroom; and, having made some slight immaterial alterations, they
apply in the next room for patents. There being no power given
to refuse them, patents are issued of course. Thus prepared, they
go forth on a retailing expedition, selling out their patent
rights . . . . [S]everal hundred thousand dollars, it is estimated,
are paid annually for void patents, many of which are thus
fraudulently obtained.49

Delay in processing petitions provided Congress the motivation needed
to change the system. Senator John Ruggles, an inventor himself, was irked
by the delay and proposed congressional action.50 Ruggles chaired a
committee to deal with the situation.51 He solicited the views of Henry
Ellsworth, son of former Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth and thenSuperintendent of Patents, as to what should be done to reform the office.52
Ellsworth emphasized the need for expertise: “If scientific men could be
induced to take an office in the patent bureau, as examiners of patents, their
examinations, aided by a suitable library, would detect almost every
interference or want of novelty.”53
Ellsworth got what he wanted. Under the 1836 Act an inventor’s claims
would be examined rather than accepted.54 As Ruggles wrote early the next
year, following the fire that consumed the Patent Office in December 1836,
an examiner had to be “fully acquainted with the principles of the invention
for which a patent is sought,” willing and able to investigate “all that has
been before known or invented either in Europe or America, on the
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

S. DOC. NO. 24-338, at 3 .
Id. at 3–4.
DOBYNS, supra note 15, at 97.
Id.
Report of Henry L. Ellsworth to the Select Committee on the Patent Laws, 8
MECHANICS’ MAG. & J. MECHANICS’ INST. 175, 178 (1836).
54. Section 6 of the 1836 Act carried forward the requirement of an inventor’s oath, and
the pamphlet provided a form for that oath. The form required an inventor to aver that “he
verily believes himself to be the original and first inventor of” the invention and that “he
does not know or believe the same was ever before known or used.” THE PATENT LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES, TOGETHER WITH INFORMATION FOR PERSONS HAVING BUSINESS TO
TRANSACT AT THE PATENT OFFICE 20 (1849), https://archive.org/details/patentlawsofunit00
unit [https://perma.cc/43GS-NA79].
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particular subject presented for his examination,” and capable of
determining “how far the invention interferes in any of its parts with other
previous inventions or things previously in use.”55 These tasks often were
difficult because applicants employed “skilful [sic] and persevering council
[sic] to urge and enforce by argument new views of the principles of his
invention, who sometimes brings to his aid much mechanical astuteness.”56
As if all this were not enough, examiners needed “a familiar knowledge of
the statute and common law on the subject, and the judicial decisions both
in England and our own country, in patent cases.”57
One commentator, himself a chief clerk of the office in the early
twentieth century, linked the 1836 reforms to rational (scientific)
administration more generally, writing that the Patent Act of 1836 (“the
1836 Act”) placed “the means for ascertaining and decreeing rights of
property in ideas and promoting the objects of a system of patent
protection . . . on an intelligent, scientific and adequate basis . . . .”58 That
assessment was too rosy, as we will see, but under the 1836 Act, the Patent
Office did become an administrative agency in a sense recognizable
today—and well before the modern administrative state began to take
shape. The 1836 Act created the office of Commissioner of Patents, and
Ellsworth became the first Commissioner, overseeing a chief clerk, an
examining clerk, three additional clerks, a machinist, and a messenger.59
The prospect of examination created demand for professionals who could
prepare an inventor’s petition with an eye to examination and represent the
inventor’s interests during the examination. Within months of the 1836
Act’s adoption, a well-known scientific figure and former Superintendent of
Patents, Dr. Thomas Jones, opened an office and begun to advertise his
services to aspiring patentees.60 When Congress authorized a second
examiner’s position in 1837, Jones filled it. He kept the job for a year
before resuming his private practice.61 During his brief return tenure, he
The
appears to have examined applications he had drawn up.62
examination system became law in July 1836; by January 1837, as we have
seen, Ruggles already was referring to the practice of employing “skilful
[sic] and persevering council [sic] to urge and enforce by argument new
views of the principles of his invention.”63

55. S. BILL NO. 107, report at 6 (1837).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Wyman, supra note 28, at 209.
59. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 2, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). Ellsworth asked for these
positions in his message to Congress. Report of Henry Ellsworth to the Select Committee on
the Patent Laws, supra note 53, at 181.
60. DOBYNS, supra note 15, at 110; Swanson, supra note 39, at 525; Post, supra note 40,
at 27, 29.
61. Post, supra note 40, at 29.
62. Id. at 29 n.15.
63. S. BILL NO. 107, report at 6 (1837).
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D. Inventors, Agents, and the Ideal of Service
The ideal of disinterested expertise waxed at the Patent Office during this
period. Yet the ideal created its own challenges. Thomas was only the first
of many Patent Office officials to construct the early equivalent of the
revolving door of administration. Keller himself remained in the office
until 1844 when, Congress having refused requests to increase pay, he
resigned and formed a patent agency with John J. Greenough, a former
department draftsman.64 (Samuel B. Morse was a client.65) Perhaps
because of his familiarity with the models, Keller was a strict examiner. At
the beginning of the application era, he denied three-quarters of the
applications he reviewed.66 His approach to patentability became more
liberal when he became an agent.67
As Robert Post has shown, Keller’s shift reflected tension between
“scientific” administration of the patent system and a more service-oriented
approach focused on inventors rather than invention.68 In 1837, Ellsworth
stated his intention “to err (if at all) on the side of liberality, leaving the
parties affected to the courts, to contest their doubtful rights,”69 but the
grant rate before 1857 was almost always 50 percent or lower,70 sinking as
low as 31 percent in 1853.71 This fact is likely attributable in part both to
the qualifications of the examiners and to their willingness to employ their
expertise.72 Keller in particular had seen the deficiencies of registration
first hand and had taken a direct role in drafting and securing adoption of
the examination system. He likely intended that these reforms be given full
effect.
At first, examiners had the sort of “extensive scientific attainments”
Senator Ruggles thought they needed.73 But qualified examiners capable of
exercising disinterested expertise were not an unqualified blessing for
applicants and their counsel. Such examiners “often proved most
resourceful at ferreting out evidence on which to base rejections for lack of
novelty. For a time, such men thoroughly dominated the examining
corps. . . . [T]heir philosophical proclivities ultimately rendered them
anathema to the patrons of the Patent Office.”74
Inventors and their counsel formed an effective interest group, and they
were perfectly capable of expressing their dissatisfaction with expert
64. Post, supra note 40, at 32.
65. Id. at 32 n.26.
66. Id. at 29.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. H.R. DOC. NO. 25-112, at 2 (1838).
70. Post, supra note 40, at 32.
71. Id. at 50.
72. The concurrent rise of the patent practitioner should have lessened the extent to
which rejections were based on errors of form.
73. See Post, supra note 40, at 28 (quoting Senator Ruggles); see also S. REP. NO. 28150, at 6 (1844) (“[I]f there is any bureau where are needed scientific attainments of a high
order, it is in the Patent Office.”).
74. Post, supra note 40, at 29.
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examination. Over time, patent agents became an organized and effective
lobby, with the Scientific American as a useful podium.75 The magazine
was then owned by Orson Munn and Alfred Beach and affiliated with
The combination was
Munn & Co., a leading patent agency.76
complementary.
For example, Scientific American reprinted the
“Information to Persons Having Business to Transact at the Patent Office”
pamphlet, together with insertions by Scientific American advertising its
services as a patent agent.77
Inventors were a relatively concentrated group compared to consumers,
and patent agents were more concentrated still. Patent agents’ interests also
differed from inventors’ interests in important ways. Ruggles’s assessment
of the benefits of examination pointed out that an examiner could point
applicants to prior art and to issued patents that might undercut the
economic value of an applicant’s invention even if he obtained a patent.78
Rigorous examination might deflate false hope and prevent inventors from
sinking costs into litigation that would be doomed to failure.79 Patent
agents, on the other hand, had a substantial stake in securing issuance of a
patent without regard to the subsequent value of the patent. This interest
would be bounded only by the risk that examination would become so lax
that patents in general might fall into disrepute, deflate in value, and thereby
reduce demand for the agents’ services.80 In any given case, an agent
would prefer to secure a grant and declare that they had done their job,
regardless of litigation nightmares that might follow from issuance of
overlapping and conflicting claims.81
Patent commissioners found it in their interest to reassure inventors.
Ellsworth left in 1845.82 His successor, Edmund Burke, wrote that “[a]n
examiner should be a living encyclopedia of science,”83 but he was equally
concerned with inventors’ welfare. His 1846 report asserts that “it cannot
be denied that, upon the principles of abstract justice, the inventor has a
complete and unquestionable claim to the fruits of his discoveries until his
labors and sacrifices are adequately remunerated,” and he recommended

75. Id. at 34.
76. Id.
77. Herbert C. Wamsley, The Rulemaking Power of the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks (Part 1), 64 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 490, 500 (1982).
78. S. DOC. NO. 24-338, at 3–4 (1836).
79. Id.
80. Cf. Swanson, supra note 39, at 530 (“[M]any agents charged only upon the
successful issuance of a patent. This contingent fee structure created an incentive for an
agent to draft the application in the form that would be most easily granted, rather than in
that which would best protect the invention.”).
81. Id.
82. Post, supra note 40, at 33.
83. H.R. DOC. NO. 29-140, at 4 (1846). Burke was a New Hampshire lawyer and
newspaperman. He served in Congress from 1839 to 1845, whereupon he was appointed
commissioner. N.J. Brumbaugh, Edmund Burke, Commissioner of Patents, 1845 to 1849, 1
J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 584 (1918).
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that, in litigation, patents be treated as conclusive rather than presumptive
evidence of validity (novelty), subject to fraud-based defenses.84
Demand for patents created tension with the ideal of expert examination.
By 1848, congressional debates over expanding the office staff devolved
into arguments over how hard the work really was and what salary was
required to attract competent examiners. The Senate passed legislation
adding two examiners and raising the salary to $2500 per year.85 The
House opted for $2000; Andrew Johnson of Tennessee argued against
increases and actually moved for a reduction in the Commissioner’s
salary.86 The Senate held firm; Senator Westcott argued that the office had
already lost five examiners who commanded twice their salary in private
practice.87 Congress authorized the additional positions at the higher
salary, but Burke’s report for 1848 emphasized that the grant rate had gone
up in recent years.88 And when it came time to fill the new jobs, Secretary
of State Buchanan reviewed the political sympathies of the candidates.89
The writing was on the wall.
In 1849, Thomas Ewbank replaced Burke, and the Patent Office moved
from the jurisdiction of the State Department to the newly created
Department of the Interior.90 As Kara Swanson has noted, Ewbank’s first
report reflected ambivalence toward patent agents.91 Ewbank asserted that
“[t]he superiority of our system consists also in the rejection of intricate
legal forms, so that every inventor of ordinary capacity may make out and
pass through the office his own papers, without the intervention of attorney
or agent.”92 He also lumped agents with a certain class of inventors who
“speculated upon” the office and found it “cheaper to give the office ten
dollars for the investigation of a case than to purchase the necessary books
and examine for themselves.”93 Recently out of office, Burke himself may
have elaborated on this charge. An unsigned article in Scientific American
insisted that, though the office was constantly accused of “partiality and
corruption,”
these charges mainly emanated, not from inventors, but from agents and
patent pirates; and if such charges are now made, we have no doubt they
84. H.R. DOC. NO. 29-52, at 5 (1847).
85. H.R. DOC. NO. 30-59 (1849).
86. Excerpts from CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in Debate on a Bill to
Increase Force and Salaries in the Patent Office, 1 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 588, 593 (1919).
87. Id. at 594.
88. H.R. DOC. NO. 30-59 (“Before I assumed the duties of Commissioner, more than half
the applications were patented. During the last four years, not quite half of those which have
been examined have been patented, and now the proportion of applications patented to those
rejected is about two to three.”).
89. Post, supra note 40, at 41.
90. Id. at 37, 39.
91. Swanson, supra note 39, at 528–29. The quotation in the text emphasizes simplicity
for inventors, but dealing with experienced professionals was simpler for patent examiners.
Id. at 528 (“When dealing with former office employees, the examiners could address a
score of cases in one meeting with a savvy practitioner, instead of painstakingly explaining
the patent law to first-time inventor after first-time inventor.”).
92. H.R. DOC. NO. 31-20, at 514–15 (1850).
93. Id. at 10.
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in the main proceed from like sources. . . . [S]uch persons . . . are the
pests of scientific improvement, instead of its promoters. Instead of
trammelling the hands of the Commissioner, Congress should give him
power to expel from the office, and disqualify from all future business
intercourse with it, patent agents, when guilty of offenses which
disqualify them from doing business in any respectable court of justice.94

It is fair to read this rejoinder as seeking to divide inventors from agents
and align the office with the comparatively sympathetic interests of
inventors. By raising the prospect of disqualifying patent agents, this
comment asserted the primacy of examination, and thus of expertise, over
the tactics of agents. As is usually the case, such an assertion would not be
necessary unless the tactics were effective. Agents could hardly be
expected to take such criticism lying down, and in its next issue, Scientific
American fired back:
The business of the Patent Office, as it respects decisions upon
applications, is conducted upon a system of erratics. Applications are
granted or rejected, according to the state of mind the examiners may be
in. There are four chief examiners in the Patent Office, each a feudal
baron on his own domain. Their decisions, therefore, sometimes resemble
boys shooting marbles along the four sides of a rectangle. One has
acquired for himself the glorious title of “the guillotine.” He knows every
thing that was, is, and is not, and never will be. It certainly looks singular
to see men making decisions, which resemble a dance of crooked sticks.
Decisions are sometimes made in the Patent Office, which amount in
substance to boxing the bones and throwing the compass overboard.95

An anonymous correspondent writing as “Daclede” extended the attack
on the “guillotine” examiner, whom he identified as William Fitzgerald:
The province of an examiner is precisely similar to that of a clerk in a
mercantile house, to whom the head of the establishment would refer a
bill for examination when presented at the counter for payment . . . . Give
me a vacillating, simple headed enthusiast, in fact, anybody, to reason
with, in preference to a dogmatic examiner.96

The charge of decision by “erratics” denied that the office exercised
expertise. This rejoinder implicitly asserts that objective decisions would
be predictable and that the supposed lack of predictability proved the
absence of expert decision making. At bottom, however, the responses
were more concerned with insisting that Scientific American—and, by
extension, agents—were the true representatives of inventors’ interests and
that the office was the true enemy.
Ewbank faced bigger challenges than skirmishing statements in
magazines. His 1851 report defended the Patent Office from oversight and
greater control by the Department of Interior, and he framed his arguments
by appealing to expertise as against political expedience.97 Again enlisting
94.
95.
96.
97.

The Patent Office, and Reform of the Patent Laws, SCI. AM., June 15, 1850, at 307.
Patent Office and Reform of the Patent Laws, SCI. AM., June 22, 1850, at 317.
Patent Office Reform, SCI. AM., Dec. 28, 1850, at 118.
S. DOC. NO. 32-118, at 10 (1852).
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the interests of inventors, Ewbank insisted that the Patent Office should not
be subordinate to political appointees such as the head of the Department of
Interior, men who “have no time to devote to it, and who, from education,
habits, profession, and feelings, can have little or no active sympathies with
interests represented in it, or with the class of citizens with whom it has
most to do . . . .”98 He insisted that “there is an increasing desire among
inventors and patentees, mechanics, manufacturers and others” that the
Patent Office should not be subordinate to the Interior Department because,
“[e]xclusively devoted to the progress of science and art,” the office needed
to be “wholly freed from political influences . . . . To suppose the business
of this office can be carried on, if its desks are occupied, as in some
departments, by persons even of general qualifications, instead of special
fitness, is a great mistake.”99
Ewbank argued that examiners
ought not to be harassed with calls to answer complaints preferred to the
Department of Interior, and often to the President, by disappointed
applicants and their friends; by parties stimulated with promises of large
sums, made payable on the issue of a patent; and by agents and
speculators, smarting under the loss of such contingent fees.100

Again seeking to divide agents from inventors, Ewbank maintained that
“[t]here is no disposition in the office to refuse patents; the feeling is the
very reverse. . . . [I]t is absurd to suppose that refusals are wantonly made,
there being no possible motive to refuse a patent, but every inducement to
grant one. When doubts exist, the benefit is always given to the
applicant.”101
An annual report is a feeble weapon against the array of foes Ewbank
identified, the grievances they asserted, and the ears they bent. His
insistence that the office was not too disposed to deny applications reflects
the narrative his foes had created and the strength it was gaining. That
narrative aimed toward increasing the grant rate, and if standards had to be
loosened and the ideal of expertise had to be swept aside, so be it.
Ewbank’s ire toward patent agents is particularly instructive. He
conceived of “inventors and patentees, mechanics, [and] manufacturers” as
his constituents, not agents.102 His version of the Information to Persons
Having Business to Transact pamphlet stated that inventors could deal with
the Patent Office without agents, that agents received no greater
consideration than inventors, and, to the contrary, that the office might
consider “imperfectly prepared” submissions “when such papers are
prepared by the inventor himself. But, if an agent be employed, it is
presumed that he is qualified for the business he has undertaken without

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
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calling on the office for instructions.”103 But Ewbank was in a bind: agents
helped inventors navigate the bureaucracy created in the 1836 Act, and at
least some agents worked on contingency. Combined with disappointed
applicants, these agents and their networks appear to have been a potent
political force—potent enough, at any rate, to provoke Ewbank’s appeal for
independence.104
Ewbank was gone in 1852,105 to be replaced in 1853 by Judge Charles
Mason. Mason worked Congress well, and by 1856, the office had thirtysix examiners and assistant examiners.106 But in his report that year, Mason
worried about the scale of the office and the inability of the Commissioner
to pay close attention to the work—particularly the rejections—of the
examiner corps. Mason was a former judge, not a scientist, and he
lamented that “very few of our lawyers have ever turned their attention in
this direction. The law relating to patents is less understood by the
profession than any other branch of that noble science.”107
Mason continued to emphasize flesh and blood inventors rather than the
abstract scientific conception of novelty. He stressed that patentability
decisions were not
matters of trivial moment; at least they are not so to the individual most
immediately interested. To him, the offspring of his mental energies are
something more than property; they are his children, for whom he has
labored through much of the fairest portion of life’s meridian, and on
whom he relies for consolation and support in the evening of its
decline.108

His concern for inventors manifested itself as a bias in favor of
traditional adjudication rather than administrative procedure as the final
forum for patentability decisions.
Mason’s preference for legal over technical expertise reflected a shift
away from the premise of expert inquiry. That is not what goes on in
courts, as Jefferson pointed out in his letter to McPherson years before.109
103. Information to Persons Having Business to Transact with the Patent Office,
reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 32-102, at 516 (1853). Agents, predictably, protested. Charles
Grafton Page et al., Some of the Written Rules of the Patent Office, 1 AM. POLYTECHNIC J.
119, 120 (1853) (“Without assigning any reason whatever, the Patent Office enforces the law
upon one class of men, patent agents, and discards it for another, viz., inventors who choose
to put their applications in an imperfect condition. In the absence of a reason we have a right
to the inference that such a rule was made to serve some personal ends.”). Page was a wellregarded former examiner. See Post, supra note 40, at 38. Swanson puts first publication of
this language in 1850. Swanson, supra note 39, at 529 n.36.
104. Information to Persons Having Business to Transact with the Patent Office,
reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 32-102, at 516. The political influence of the patent bar is
explored in Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice & Interest Groups
in the Development of American Patent Law: 1790–1870 (Case Legal Studies, Research
Paper No. 08-24, 2008; Univ. Ill. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. LE07-007, 2008), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1262970 [https://perma.cc/2R2N-V4CY].
105. Post, supra note 40, at 43.
106. Id. at 47.
107. S. REP. NO. 34-20, at 5 (1856).
108. Id.
109. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 28.
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Yet Mason recommended that Congress consider returning to “former
practices of the office, making the duties of the examiners simply advisory,
and allowing a patent in all cases, provided the applicant should finally
insist upon it, notwithstanding the opinion of the [Patent Office] as to its
invalidity.”110 As Mason put it, his proposal
would render the same high order of qualifications and experience less
absolutely essential in the examining corps.
Most of the legal
controversies now arising in the [Patent Office] would be turned over to
the courts of law, which are not only so much better qualified to
adjudicate, but which possess the necessary machinery to investigate and
conduct such matters, so as to lead to a result more satisfactory than can
be done here.111

The following year, Mason recommended that Congress consider
(re)adopting a procedure akin to scire facias.112 In 1857, he noted an
increase over the prior year in patents granted and praised the American
system as avoiding the evils of registration or overly strict examination.
His office eschewed “that stern, unsympathizing, distrusting temper, which
would receive the inventor as a stranger beneath the roof of this magnificent
edifice, which has been reared at once as a monument to his genius, and as
a depository of the trophies of his labors.”113 Instead, under Mason, the
office welcomed “the inventor as a friend and patron, in that frank and free
conference with him enjoined by law, kindly and anxiously sifts from his
invention its minutest patentable features . . . .”114
Patent agents were duly appreciative. When Mason resigned, Scientific
American wrote that “[h]e was prompt and fearless in his decisions. He
believed that the Patent laws were instituted for the benefit and
encouragement
of
inventors,
and
he
interpreted
them
accordingly . . . . Much of his time was devoted to the repeal of decisions
by illiberal examiners.”115 For his part, upon leaving the Patent Office
Mason wrote a nice blurb to Scientific American praising the Munn agency
as having worked on one quarter of the patents issued during his tenure.116
Five months later, he was working for Munn.117
James Holt replaced Mason and took solicitousness for inventors to new
heights. The patent laws, he argued,
should be liberally construed, having ever in view the great end they were
designed to subserve . . . . That office, in my judgment, would be
110. S. REP. No. 34-20, at 5. Mason did recommend that such patents give notice of the
Patent Office’s negative opinion and that Congress might give existing patentees the right to
contest issuance of a patent the Patent Office felt interfered with a previous grant. Id.
111. Id. at 6. Whether such rights existed was the question at issue in such cases.
112. H.R. DOC. NO. 34-65, at 5–6 (1857). Part I.F discusses the scire facias doctrine and
its history in the patent acts. See infra notes 174–78 and accompanying text.
113. H.R. DOC. NO. 35-32, at 2 (1858).
114. Id.
115. The Late Commissioner of Patents, SCI. AM., Sept. 12, 1857, at 8.
116. Judge Mason to the Scientific American Patent Agency, SCI. AM., Aug. 29, 1857, at
402.
117. DOBYNS, supra note 15, at 149.
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forgetful of its mission, and disloyal to one of the highest interests of
humanity, were it to permit itself to be entangled in a mesh of mere
words, or palsied by doubts, born of intricate metaphysical disquisitions.
It has to do with the substance of things, and to deal with the earnest,
ingenuous, practical intellect of the age, and it should be dealt with
frankly, not perplexing and discouraging inventors, by subtle distinctions,
but kindly taking them by the hand, as the benefactors of their race, and
strewing, if possible, their pathway with sunshine and with flowers.118

Patent agents liked that idea. Scientific American noted that Holt’s view
represented a departure from historical practices—a view it thought more
“liberal” than before.119 It drew a line between new examiners, who got
Holt’s message and followed it, and the old “croakers,” who remained
stubbornly mired in old ways.120 To the extent one may infer the views of
patent agents from the opinions of Scientific American at the time, Holt’s
administration emboldened them. The prospect that they could take
prosecution matters on contingency with a high probability of getting a
patent of some scope issued must have been intoxicating.
The implications of the situation were made clear two years later, in
Commissioner Bishop’s annual report. In 1859, he asked Congress to
amend the law so that interferences were resolved in favor of the first to file
either a caveat (a form of provisional application) or an application.121 He
conjectured that his proposal would “be sanctioned by most men of
standing and respectability,” but that “a certain class of patent agents, who
seek to make profit by aiding dishonest men in annoying and robbing
honest inventors of their just rights rather than by an honorable practice of
their profession, may endeavor to defeat any amendment of the law which
will diminish litigation, fraud, perjury, and corruption.”122 He regretted
“that the present law affords so many facilities for the dishonest practices of
such men, by whom innocent inventors are continually plundered.”123
Bishop revived the traditional practice of asking for more examiners,
asserting, “Rather than suffer the business of the office to become seriously
delayed we have been compelled to grant patents upon hasty examinations.
As a natural consequence, many things have been patented which ought to
have been rejected.”124 But the tide had turned. “Of the twelve principal
examiners in the office when Holt took over, five had been removed by
early 1858 and all but two of the rest before the war.”125 Conventional
politics played a role—the Civil War loomed on the horizon, after all, and
some examiners were “Black Republicans”—but Post argues convincingly

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Commissioner Holt’s Decision, SCI. AM., Nov. 14, 1857, at 78.
Id.
State of Affairs at the Patent Office, SCI. AM., Dec. 26, 1857, at 125.
H.R. DOC. NO. 36-299, at 6 (1860).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Post, supra note 40, at 49.
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that “liberalization” of standards and the consequent reduction in emphasis
on “scientific” examination was important, too.126
In 1860, Scientific American praised the “very marked change” in the
office over the preceding three years and noted that “its officers, with few
exceptions, exhibit in their official views and actions a uniform and
commendable liberality of disposition toward inventors.”127 When, a few
months later, Commissioner Thomas proposed a “Revising Board” of two
examiners, to whom other examiners would have to justify decisions to
issue patents, a correspondent to Scientific American objected that the
examiners appointed “have been educated in the illiberal old school practice
of the [Patent] Office, which prevailed as far back as 1850, 1851, and 1852,
when terror to the inventor reigned triumphant.”128 The editors added a
footnote explaining that
[i]t was in these years that two thirds of the applications for patents were
rejected. In 1853 Judge Mason was appointed to the Commissionership,
and he soon brought about a new order of things, by impressing upon the
Examiners the fact that it was their duty to see on what points in an
invention placed before them a patent could be allowed, instead of
studying to discover on what grounds they could reject an application.129

Scientific American complained that, in the first week of results after the
new board began its work, only thirty patents issued, compared to a
previous weekly rate of one hundred.130 Thomas lasted only ten months
before moving to President Buchanan’s cabinet as Secretary of the
Treasury.131 The revisory board turned out to be toothless and in any event
lasted barely longer than Thomas.132
Scientific American, and doubtless inventors and agents as well, wanted
to have its cake and eat it too. It wanted highly qualified examiners whose
reputations would command deference from courts, but who would help
applicants get patents, not point out the lack of novelty of their inventions.
Political hacks could satisfy the second condition, but endangered the first.
In 1861, it protested that “we have earnestly contended against debasing the
Patent Office into a political cesspool, to be groveled in by a mess of
loafers, such as hang about Custom Houses and other hot beds of political
corruption.”133 It complained that
[t]he Patent Office has gradually become demoralized, and is losing that
dignified position which it enjoyed even but a short time ago, some of its
attaches being unfitted, either mentally or morally, to fill the places they

126.
127.
128.
at 299.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
New Arrangements at the Patent Office, SCI. AM., July 2, 1860, at 10.
Trouble at the Patent Office—“Revising Board” Appointed, SCI. AM., Nov. 3, 1860,
Id.
New Order of Things at the Patent Office, SCI. AM., Nov. 10, 1860, at 313.
DOBYNS, supra note 15, at 154.
Letter from Washington, SCI. AM., June 1, 1861, at 342.
The New President and the Commissioner of Patents, SCI. AM., Mar. 9, 1861, at 153.
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now occupy; and inventors have become, in some degree, disgusted with
the whole concern.134

The Patent Act was amended in 1861, in part to secure “greater
uniformity of action in the grant and refusal of letters” by appointing
three examiners-in-chief . . . to be composed of persons of competent
legal knowledge and scientific ability, whose duty it shall be, on the
written petition of the applicant for that purpose being filed, to revise and
determine upon the validity of decisions made by examiners when
adverse to the grant of letters-patent.135

Congressional debate over the provision raised the question whether such
appointees could in fact be expected to be disinterested experts. New
Hampshire Senator John Hale scoffed at the idea that
these examiners will be scientific men, legal men, men that are well
qualified. Does not the Senator know, and does not everybody who
knows anything about the Patent Office know, that it is just as much a
piece of party machinery as the Supreme Court is, or any other
department of the Government?136

Hale’s criticism implied that examination of prospective patent
A
examiners did not interfere with political considerations.137
correspondent writing as “Aquinas” expressed similar views in Scientific
American, complaining that the Patent Office,
[i]n spite of the good intentions of the Commissioner[,] . . . is becoming
more and more, under its present regime, an asylum for deaf and dumb
fossils and political hacks. . . . [C]annot the inventor’s interest be better
served than by stuffing mere politicians into technical places for which
they have no fitness?138

In 1866, Scientific American complained that “Jefferson’s rule, ‘Is he
honest? [I]s he faithful?’[,] has given way to the more dangerous rule, ‘Is
he a good party man, has he political influence?’”139
The second half of the nineteenth century tended to confirm these
assessments. Between 1869 and 1901, five former members of Congress
became patent commissioners.140 Three of these were lame ducks who had
lost an election; the commissioner’s post was a sinecure granted by soon-tobe-former colleagues.141 Between 1861 and 1877, the three-member board
of appeals had fifteen members.142 In 1877, Commissioner Spear
complained that “[u]nder such conditions it must appear inevitable that
134. Id.
135. The Patent Act, ch. 88, § 2, 12 Stat. 246 (1861) (emphasis omitted).
136. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1732 (1860).
137. For an assessment of such examination, see Caveat Fees and Applications for
Patents, SCI. AM., Apr. 27, 1861, at 266.
138. Condition of the Patent Office, SCI. AM., July 27, 1861, at 54.
139. The Commissioner of Patents, SCI. AM., Oct. 13, 1866, at 253.
140. LEONARD D. WHITE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA:
1869–1901:
A STUDY IN
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 223 (1958).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 224.
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there could not have been uniformity or the constant exercise of the wisest
discretion in the granting of patents. The whole tendency has been toward
an excessive issue of patents, and there is need of constant supervision.”143
E. The Pendulum Swings Back
By 1868, the tide began to shift again, and the notion of expertise and the
attendant prospect of rigorous examination were again at the center of the
debates. In his 1867 report, Commissioner Theaker wrote that “to some the
thorough acquaintance of an examiner with his class is simply regarded as a
possible obstacle in the way of obtaining a patent.”144 Commissioner Foote
announced merits-based cleaning of the stables in 1869.145 He wrote that
he was “unable to attribute the extraordinary increase of the last few years
in the number of patents issued to an equal increase of real improvements;
for I apprehend that much of apparent prosperity has arisen from the
allowance of patents that should never have been granted.”146 He
complained that examiners’ decisions were subject to rigorous review when
they denied an application, but
[a]n examiner’s action receives no such scrutiny when he allows a patent.
If he be pressed for time, or be indifferent as to his duties, he may put an
end to his labors by a simple indorsement [sic]. If he lacks capacity, there
will then be no exposure of his ignorance or of the unsoundness of his
views. It may have happened that in some instances the allowance of
patents has served to cloak incapacity and indifference to duty.147

Foote therefore made it a priority to “improve the qualifications of
examiners and obtain a high order of ability in the examining corps.”148 He
appointed a three-man committee to examine the qualifications of the
examiners.149 He reported that “[t]he duty has been, so far, faithfully and
judiciously performed, and several changes in the [Patent Office] have
resulted therefrom.”150 Things evidently had deteriorated to the point that
Scientific American applauded this move.
“Among other reforms
introduced,” it wrote, “is that of examination of examiners, to see if they are
qualified for their duties.”151 In the future,
before any appointment can be made the candidate will be thoroughly
examined as to his fitness for the place. He must possess at least some
show of qualification or he cannot be appointed. All those now in the
Office will have to submit to this examination, and if found unqualified
will be discharged. . . . The Commissioner intends to raise the standard of
principal examiners to that of the judges of our common courts, and
143. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS FOR 1877, at xiii (1878).
144. H.R. DOC. NO. 40-96, at 6 (1868).
145. H.R. DOC. NO. 40-52, at 5 (1869).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Special Correspondence of the Scientific American—Affairs at the Patent Office,
SCI. AM., Sept. 16, 1868, at 180.
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means to do away with the practice heretofore in vogue of appointing
persons to positions simply because they happen to be related to some
M.C. or Senator.152

Judges of course were not selected for scientific expertise, and political
influence is not wholly unknown in judicial selection, so this aspiration is
telling in and of itself.
The Patent Office introduced competitive examinations for patent
examiners in 1869, thirteen years before the Pendleton Act began inching
the civil service as a whole toward merit-based selection.153 Commissioner
Fisher explained that
it may be conceded that, by this method, in exceptional cases, a competent
man may be kept out of office, but an incompetent one can very rarely
come in. To lessen the chances of error, great care has been taken in
adapting the examination to the work to be done, so that theory and
practice must both be combined to achieve the highest measure of
success[,] . . . the result upon the Office at large, and especially as shown
in the character and capacity of new employees, has been most
gratifying.154

In a famous article in the North American Review, Jacob D. Cox, an
ardent civil service reformer, then recently departed as Secretary of the
Interior, praised the Patent Office as “demonstrative proof” of the benefits
of competitive examination designed to weed out incompetent aspirants for
agency jobs.155
Lawyers continued to play their part in the problems of the Patent Office.
A pension act providing for disability payments was adopted in 1862156
and, owing to the carnage of the Civil War, pensions became big legal
business in the post-war period.157 Pension applications were made ex
parte, without examination of the applicant, so the system resembled the
patent-by-oath practice of the 1793 Act.158 It was an invitation to fraud,
which was acknowledged as inevitable.159 Lawyers trolled for clients who
might claim pensions, and the full range of supposedly modern abuses were

152. Id.
153. H.R. DOC. NO. 41-102, at 6–7 (1870); Civil Service Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
1870.
154. H.R. DOC. NO. 41-102, at 7. One assessment states: “The result of Commissioner
Fisher’s policy was shown in the character of the new members of the corps, who in all the
requirements of the position readily demonstrated a superiority over those in Office who had
come in under the old order.” William I. Wyman, Samuel Sparks Fisher, 2 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 490, 494 (1919).
155. Jacob D. Cox, The Civil-Service Reform, 112 N. AM. REV. 81, 100 (1871). Cox was
a Union general in the Civil War and thus knew President Grant, but the two parted ways on
a variety of topics, abbreviating Cox’s tenure as Secretary of War. For a brief summary of
the Patent Office’s practice relative to other branches of administration, see WHITE, supra
note 140, at 214–15.
156. 12 Stat. 566 (1862). For an overview, see WHITE, supra note 140, at 209.
157. See WHITE, supra note 140, at 209.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 215–17.
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on display.160 In 1898, 60,000 lawyers were authorized to practice before
the pension board.161 One of them, George Lemon, had 125,000 matters
(including pending and rejected claims) in his office.162 An 1878 statute
used price regulation to address the problem, limiting fees in pension cases
to ten dollars.163
At this point, both the Pension Board and the Patent Office operated from
within the Department of Interior and, from a certain very crude angle, both
pension applications and patent applications involved getting things from
the government. So, to some pension agents, it seemed natural to expand
their practice to include patent applications as well. In his 1869 annual
report, Commissioner Fisher summarized the problems patent agents posed
for the Patent Office—pursuing contingent fees they sought patents on
“mere technical combinations” and cared more “about the number than the
quality of those which they obtain.”164 The worst of them “adopt this
business as an incident to a claim agency, and press for patents as they press
for back pay and pensions.”165 They took advantage of inventors who were
often “poor, uneducated, and lacking any legal knowledge” and who wanted
“a cheap solicitor, and do not know how to choose a good one.”166
Solicitors who “care for nothing but to give [clients] something called a
patent, that they may secure their own fee, have in too many instances
proved a curse.”167
As noted above, dissatisfaction with the practices of patent agents
predated the 1862 Pension Act. The 1861 amendment to the Patent Act
gave the Commissioner power, “for gross misconduct,” to “refuse to
recognize any person as a patent agent, either generally or in any particular
case; but the reasons of the Commissioner for such refusal shall be duly
recorded, and subject to the approval of the President of the United
States.”168 This provision echoed Burke’s call, as a private citizen, eleven
years earlier. The provision was carried forward in the 1870 Act, though it
160. Peter David Blanck & Michael Millender, Before Disability Civil Rights: Civil War
Pensions and the Politics of Disability in America, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1, 22, 31 (2000) (“The
most successful pension lawyers of the late nineteenth century hired agents who scoured the
docks and alleyways of major cities in search of poor veterans who were unaware of their
pension eligibility. . . . Pension lawyers were allowed to collect ten dollars for each claim
they pursued. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Bureau’s critics denounced them as
parasites who were responsible for defrauding both the government and their own clients.”).
161. Id. at 31.
162. Id.; see also Theda Skocpol, America’s First Social Security System: The Expansion
of Benefits for Civil War Veterans, 108 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 103 (1993).
163. 20 Stat. 243, ch. 367 (1878).
164. H.R. DOC. NO. 41-102, at 9 (1870).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 12 Stat. 247 (1860); Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (noting
statutory history). Commissioner Colfax’s annual report for 1863 hinted at dissatisfaction
with aggressive agents: “It is the duty of patent agents, who now form so important a class
of professional men in this country, not too earnestly to press doubtful applications, and not
to demand of the office a liberality in granting patents, which, if carried too far, would
destroy the system which is the foundation of their business.” ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS FOR 1863, at 17 (1864).
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only required the consent of the Secretary of the Interior rather than the
President.169 In 1870, Scientific American reported that Foote had
suspended McGill, Grant & Co., and George W. McGill from practice, the
first suspensions the editors knew of, though the power had existed for nine
years.170
The Patent Office’s power was expanded in 1884, when Congress gave
the Secretary of the Interior power to
prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents,
attorneys, or other persons representing claimants before his
department . . . [and] after notice and opportunity for hearing, suspend or
exclude from further practice before his department any such person,
agent or attorney shown to be incompetent, disreputable, or who refuses
to comply with the said rules and regulations . . . .171

The statute was aimed at pension agents but, as the Patent Office was in
the Department of Interior as well, by its terms it also extended to patent
agents. Consistent with the statutory text, Wedderburn v. Bliss172 held that
such discipline was administrative and not subject to judicial review. The
Patent Office began registering attorneys in 1899 and, in 1922, it received
the power to enact its own regulations of patent agents and attorneys.173
F. The Rise and Decline of the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine
The 1790 and 1793 Acts had a crude mechanism that theoretically might
have helped compensate for the limited expertise possessed by the Board of
Arts and the absence of expertise in the registration system. Each act
carried forward a form of the English writ of scire facias by creating a right
of action to cancel a patent.174 Within a year of issuance, under the 1790
Act, or three years under the 1793 Act, a challenger could submit an oath
showing that the patent had been obtained “surreptitiously, or upon false
suggestion.”175 Courts receiving such oaths could issue orders to show
cause why the patent should not be repealed.176 This right of action
provided means by which persons with expertise showing a patent invalid
could bring that expertise to bear within the patent system broadly
construed, though not the grant process itself. The right of action was not

169. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 17, 16 Stat. 198–217 (1870).
170. The Commissioner Suspends a Patent Agent for Gross Misconduct, SCI. AM., Aug.
27, 1870, at 136. Just before resigning in 1870, Fisher struck Otto Leissring from the rolls
for pocketing client funds. Another Patent Agent in Trouble, SCI. AM., Dec. 3, 1870, at 356.
171. 23 Stat. 101 (1884).
172. 12 App. D.C. 485 (D.C. 1898).
173. 42 Stat. 390 (1921).
174. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109–12; Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 10, 1
Stat. 318–23; see Ex parte Wood & Brundage, 22 U.S. 603, 609 (1824) (section 10 of the
1793 Act was designed “to provide some means to repeal patents which have been obtained
surreptitiously, or upon false suggestions; the very cases for which a scire facias issues at the
common law”).
175. Wood & Brundage, 22 U.S. at 605.
176. A more extensive version of this history may be found in David McGowan,
Inequitable Conduct, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 945 (2010).
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carried forward in the 1836 Act.177 “Only in the case of interference did the
1836 Act provide a private right that might lead to cancellation,”178 though,
as we have seen, Commissioner Mason’s legalism led him to recommend
the revival of scire facias practice.179
Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear180 and Mowry v. Whitney181 noted
the 1836 Act’s elimination of the private right of action for cancellation;
Mowry conceived of the writ as asserting a right belonging to the defrauded
party—the government.182 United States v. American Bell Telephone
Co.183 held that the government could sue to repeal a fraudulently procured
patent, though the 1836 Act contained no such provision.184 The modern
doctrine began to take shape with Keystone Driller Co. v. General
Excavator Co.,185 which held that fraud on the PTO compelled vacatur of a
fraudulently obtained judgment.
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co.186 extended Keystone.
The patentee in Hazel-Atlas drafted an article to be used in support of a
patent application and paid a well-known union official to sign it.187 The
patentee submitted the article to the PTO, passing it off as the official’s own
The patent issued, and Hartford sued Hazel-Atlas for
work.188
infringement.189 Hartford lost at the trial court and, on appeal, relied
heavily on the article.190 The appellate court entered a judgment of validity
and infringement; its opinion quoted Hartford’s article.191 Hazel-Atlas then
tracked down the union president to question him about the article.192 He
177. Section 6 of the 1793 Act also allowed a defendant sued for infringement to defend
on the ground that the patent lacked novelty, recovering costs for a successful defense. Id. at
948–49.
178. McGowan, supra note 176, at 950.
179. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
180. 76 U.S. 788 (1869).
181. 81 U.S. 434 (1871).
182. Courts applying Mowry read it to bar ordinary defendants from asserting inequitable
conduct as a defense. See Vortex Mfg. Co. v. Ply-Rite Contracting Co., 33 F.2d 302 (D. Md.
1929).
183. 128 U.S. 315 (1888).
184. Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chem. Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 374 (1928) (no fraud
shown where patentee submitted declaration claiming to have used accelerant to vulcanize
rubber but had only shown that the accelerant worked without vulcanizing anything:
“Production of rubber goods for use or sale was not indispensable to the granting of the
patent. Hence the affidavits, though perhaps reckless, were not the basis for it or essentially
material to its issue. The reasonable presumption of validity furnished by the grant of the
patent therefore would not seem to be destroyed”); Burke Elec. Co. v. Indep. Pneumatic Tool
Co., 232 F. 145 (2d Cir. 1916) (affirming holding of Judge Learned Hand, then a district
judge, that defense would not lie where the description, though misleading, was not
intentionally so and the misleading element concerned the operation of the invention rather
than the elements of patentability).
185. 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
186. 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
187. Id. at 240.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 241.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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would not talk to Hazel-Atlas, but he did give Hartford an affidavit and
received eight thousand dollars shortly thereafter.193 Holding that “[t]here
are issues of great moment to the public in a patent suit,” the Court vacated
the judgment.194 The following year, the Court wrote that “[a] patent by its
very nature is affected with a public interest,”195 the language that begins
Rule 56 to this day.
Dissenting in Hazel-Atlas, Justice Roberts noted that “[i]t is complained
that members of the bar have knowingly participated in the fraud.
Remedies are available to purge recreant officers from the tribunals on
whom the fraud was practiced.”196 The PTO took notice. It instituted
disciplinary proceedings against three lawyers involved in the proceedings
and disbarred them.197 Prosecution counsel, Dorsey, appealed.198 The D.C.
Circuit reversed, in part chiding the PTO for lacking ordinary common
sense, much less expertise:
It was the duty of the Patent Office under the law to investigate these
matters for itself, to arrive at a determination on the facts and evidence
presented and not to shift the burden of its own responsibilities to a blind
reliance on some article presented from some trade journal, which with
ordinary intelligence it might have known to be self-serving for the party
offering it.199

The Supreme Court was not persuaded. It reversed, in a brief per curiam
opinion.200
Rule 1.56 was adopted in 1977.201 The PTO said it codified “the existing
[Patent] Office policy on fraud and inequitable conduct, which is believed
consistent with the prevailing case law in the federal courts.”202 Some
commentators disagreed that the rule reflected previous office practice,203
but with the backing of the Supreme Court, the existence—if not the
contours—of such a duty was secure. Like the rigor of examination and the
193. Id. at 242.
194. Id. at 246.
195. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945).
196. Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 252.
197. See Hatch v. Ooms, 69 F. Supp. 788 (1947).
198. Dorsey v. Kingsland, 173 F.2d 405, 407 (1949), rev’d, Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338
U.S. 318 (1949).
199. Id.
200. Kingsland, 338 U.S. 318.
201. 42 Fed. Reg. 5588, 5589 (1977).
202. Id. Some privilege-related objections were raised. The PTO was unimpressed:
Several comments concerned whether attorneys and agents could represent their
clients’ interests and at the same time comply with § 1.56. Similar comments were
directed to §§ 1.97 to 1.99. It is of course in the interest of the client to have a
valid patent and this cannot be obtained without disclosure of known material
facts. It is not inconsistent for an attorney or agent to fulfill his duty of candor and
good faith to the Office and to act as an advocate for his client. The submission of
information under § 1.56 does not preclude the submission of arguments that such
information does not render the subject matter of the application unpatentable.
Id. at 5590.
203. John T. Roberts, The Disclosure Duty: Its Evolution, Scope, and Limitations, 5
APLA Q. J. 154 (1977).

1954

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

ideal of disinterested expertise, the inequitable conduct doctrine waxed and
waned over the years. Some cases relied on Rule 1.56 in assessing
materiality of alleged misstatement or omissions.204 PTO practitioners
decried a “plague” of allegations, however, and called for the doctrine to be
narrowed.205 As before, they proved to be an influential group. In
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,206 the Federal Circuit held
that inequitable conduct requires proof of intent to defraud the PTO and
but-for materiality, meaning that a patent would not have issued but for
deceit by a patentee or its agent.207
II. LAWYERING WITHIN THE DOMAIN OF EXPERTISE
The history surveyed in Part I illustrates important aspects of the
relationship between administration as a means of regulation and the
practice of law. At all points in time, patentees had to sue infringers in
court, so ordinary litigation practices were never absent from the picture.
Under the 1793 Act, however, they were essentially all that stood between a
purported inventor and his hoped-for riches. The picture became more
complicated when the 1836 Act introduced the prospect of expert review.
In theory, patents that issued after expert scrutiny deserved a greater
presumption of validity than patents that issued upon oath under the
registration system. Expert examination up front would tend to favor
patentees in litigation, but if lawyers worked both sides of the street, there
would be no net effect on their business over the general run of cases,
except to the extent that fewer patents implied fewer cases.208
The picture looked different from an ex ante perspective. Greater
confidence in issued patents would be no solace to a client whose
application was rejected. Neither would it do much for counsel prosecuting
the application on a contingent fee basis. Lawyers and agents who limited
their practice to prosecution, therefore, might well favor the appearance of
expert review without the substance. Litigators working both sides of the
street might favor that approach as well, at least to the extent that more
patents might imply more work. Lawyers who represent only infringers
might hope for more stringent, gold-plated review to avoid a lemons-style
problem, but even they would realize that a patent that does not issue
cannot be asserted.
Patent lawyers thus straddle the fence of expert review. They want
patents to carry the prestige of having passed examination while retaining
as much of their own strategy space as possible. The antagonism to strict
“illiberal” review seen in the 1840s and 1850s reflects a basic antagonism
204. Id.
205. A small sample of this output is cited in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson &
Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
206. 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
207. Id. at 1292.
208. Which might not be the case: if patentees under the registration system were less
likely to invest in litigation than patentees that already survived examination, then the
number of infringement suits might be roughly the same.
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between lawyers who seek maneuvering room to ply their trade and
examiners who wanted to apply expertise.209 To an expert examiner, an
invention either was or was not novel in relation to the prior art, for
example, and while the nature of the question of novelty might be specified
by statute, the answer and the means of obtaining it posed technical
questions.
From this perspective, the lawyer’s tradecraft—drawing
distinctions, framing facts, inflating or deflating the significance of
evidence, making tactical concessions, and so on—amounted to noise.
This ambivalence can be seen in the unsuccessful efforts of lawyers to
use state licensing regulations to exclude nonlawyers from practice before
the PTO. In the early 1960s, Florida sued Alexander Sperry, a nonlawyer
admitted to practice before the PTO, to enjoin him from pursuing his
practice while a resident in Florida.210 Though conceding that patent
prosecution is “the practice of law,” the Court held that federal regulation of
practice before the PTO precluded Florida from asserting its laws against
unlicensed practice to enjoin Sperry’s PTO work.211 A group of patent
agents submitted a brief as amici curiae asking how mastery of bar subjects
suited one to prosecute patents and whether Florida bar examiners felt
qualified to assess a patent agent’s application—good points, each.212
In Sperry v. Florida Bar,213 the bar’s protectionist impulses ran headlong
into both science and history, and lawyerly self-interest proved too weak to
overcome their combined force. The bar’s effort is instructive, however, as
providing a concrete example of a contested conceptual space between
lawyers’ work and “science,” or, more generally, between advocacy and
expertise. I contend that we may extrapolate from the example of patent
prosecution, and from its history, to draw more general insights regarding
the relationship between lawyers and the administrative state. Though there
are many justifications for regulation, an agency’s claim of disinterested
expertise will tend to produce stricter rules on lawyers’ behavior than would
be found absent that claim.
A. Distinguishing Regulatory Justifications
Roughly speaking, we can identify three genres of regulation; it is best to
think of these genres of regulation as shading into one another on a
continuum, rather than as distinct categories. In the first, a regulation is
justified by specialized knowledge an agency claims to have. An invention
either is or is not useful, novel, and nonobvious; a cancer drug either is or is
not safe and effective, relative to a placebo.
The second genre adds administrative enforcement to things that are
unlawful already; the SEC or FTC may punish false statements about a
company or its products, for example. Such belt-and-suspenders regulation
209. See supra Part I.
210. Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
211. Id. at 383.
212. Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Ass’n of Registered Patent Attorneys & Agents at 4,
Sperry, 373 U.S. 379, 1962 WL 115181.
213. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
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may target legitimate areas of underenforcement, but underenforcement
itself implies only a need for more or better enforcers. Underenforcement
does not entail the need for a new agency. A claim to specialized
knowledge thus helps justify agency regulation as the form the extra layer
of enforcement takes.
A third category combines the first two. Expertise may be employed to
create new categories of wrongs not otherwise explicitly prohibited. Thus,
the SEC may mandate particular forms of accounting and treat deviations as
unlawful, the FDA may prohibit the sale of drugs that have not been shown
to be safe and effective using specified methods, or the EPA may set limits
on discharges.214
Before exploring the implications of the first category, I want to
acknowledge some limitations on these distinctions. These categories
exclude some important features of regulation. As a practical matter,
regulation is often just cartelization with a government stamp. Much
licensing—including licensing of lawyers—is like this. We should not lose
sight of this fact, but for the moment we can focus on the claim of expertise
as a justification for regulation, even if in fact the justification is just
window dressing. The claim to possess expertise is a sideshow when
protectionism is at work, but the claim still may be significant with respect
to how the agency approaches lawyers who practice before it. These
distinctions also do not talk about vertical integration of enforcement, or
about how modes of regulation rulemaking is different from adjudication,
which in turn is different from oversight by the late, unlamented Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS). And some tasks that are uniquely federal—
immigration being an obvious example, as well as import-related regulation
such as is practiced in the International Trade Commission—will tend
toward the agency form because there is no ready alternative.
Finally, disinterested expertise is good, but it is not—and cannot be—
everything.215 Even assuming we can discern that mandatory vaccination
will have debilitating side effects in ten cases while saving one hundred
lives, we must decide whether the trade-off is worth it. We can construct
equations expressing these trade-offs, but the values of the variables have to
come from somewhere, and there is no reason to expect that disinterested
expertise can answer what is essentially a question of values. Various
flavors of Hume may be recited—even assuming we can get a handle on the
“is” of the question, doing so does not get us to “ought.”216

214. As this example shows, general laws—such as nuisance—may capture some conduct
that agencies may target more specifically.
215. This idea is a persistent theme of Steven Goldberg’s work and the later work of
Arthur Leff. STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH: LAW AND SCIENCE IN AMERICA (1994);
Arthur A. Leff, Law and Technology: On Shoring Up a Void, 8 OTTAWA L. REV. 536
(1976); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity:
The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (1973) (exploring similar
themes).
216. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford
Clarendon Press 1896), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/342 [https://perma.cc/D3CA-FA5V].
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The appeal of expertise cannot be realized in full. Even where it might
succeed as a scientific matter, practical application drags expertise into the
muddled mire of politics and ethics. From this angle, there is no such thing
as “disinterested” expertise because expert procedures contest with
alternatives such as faith, ideology, and custom. Lawyering in the
regulatory state therefore may be viewed as part of a problem memorably
described by Arthur Leff as the conflict between the desire for “findable
rules that authoritatively and unambiguously direct us how to live” and
desire to be free to choose what to do and how to live.217
Nevertheless, none of these limitations implies that distinguishing among
regulatory justifications is pointless or that we can learn nothing by
exploring the first category, in which administration is justified at least in
part by the claim to possess expertise. Thus caveated, I contend that, in
general, agencies claiming to wield expertise will want to reign in lawyers
in rough proportion to the plausibility of that claim. The stronger the claim,
the more an agency will try to reign in lawyers, and vice versa. The reason
is simple: within the domain of expertise, lawyers have relatively little to
do. Their stock in trade—framing and other rhetorical tricks, bluffing,
crafty negotiation, cloaking evidence with the veils of privilege or work
product—is of little value when the question is whether lead in gasoline is
bad for people, whether Thalidomyde crosses the placental barrier and
disrupts the formation of a fetus, or whether Cetuximab is effective in
patients with KRAS mutant cancers.
Within the domain of disinterested expertise, lawyers, as lawyers, are
more likely to contribute noise than signal. They can serve as efficient
information gatherers, and in some cases can enhance clarity through the
arrangement of information in relation to specified purposes, but
arrangement is a relatively thin increment of information, and lawyers are
duty-bound to favor arrangements that favor their clients, which may or
may not imply arrangements that increase the efficiency of administration.
B. Tension Between Truth and Competing Values
This point may be sharpened further, though at the risk of caricature.
Suppose there are two types of issues of possible interest to lawyers: truth
and fairness. In the domain of truth, we presume a high degree of
consensus on standards for assessing some subject; we denote that
consensus by proclaiming that the standards are “objective.” In the domain
of fairness, subjectivity counts. Even if there are some objective standards
for some assessment, within the domain of fairness they do not exhaust all
points relevant to a question. This division roughly corresponds to the way
defamation law determines whether a statement is one of fact or one of
opinion, though this division raises some distinct problems of its own.218
217. Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1229
(emphasis omitted).
218. E.g., David McGowan, Copyright and Convergence: A Pragmatic Perspective, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION OF FACT-BASED WORKS: COPYRIGHT AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES 233 (Robert Brauneis ed., 2009); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept
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This dichotomy has some tricky aspects. Many true propositions would
gain lots of votes as being fair, but those votes are not essential to truth.
Propositions that imply or entail horribly unfair things may nonetheless be
true. Some might take issue with the second presumption necessary for this
dichotomy to work: that there is no truth of the matter about fairness. I
think that is right. There are (lawyerly) ways to tease truth out of fairness,
though they tend to involve sociobiological explanations that are
controversial and which try to lessen the subjectivity of fairness by
grounding it in science.
This dichotomy does not entail that any given problem implicates only
one domain. There may be a truth of the matter about whether the
defendant killed the victim, as there is about whether a molecule starves
cancerous cells, but it does not follow that truth is all that is at stake if we
put the defendant on trial. If it did, all reliable methods of investigation
would be acceptable, yet the law layers fairness concerns (thinly) on top of
this goal. The right to counsel and prohibitions on beating confessions out
of suspects come to mind.
The domains of fairness and truth coexist, but often they are in tension
and the relative influence of the domains changes over time. Within the
domain of expertise, as the administrative state grows it stakes greater
claims to truth as a value and tries to expand the domain in which lawyers
and clients must conform their behavior to the primacy of that value. Often
that means strict disclosure obligations imposed by financial regulators and
the PTO that would (for now) seem bizarre and unconstitutional in a
criminal trial. The lure of expertise exerts a more subtle influence, as
lawyers leverage scientific evidence or explain, apologetically, that
convictions may be had even without the sort of forensic evidence jurors
might see on television.
III. WHAT WILL REMAIN?
Most readers of this Article have been wily enough to see what is
coming, so let me repeat: claims to expertise may fail, expertise possessed
may not be applied, and where regulation is justified on grounds other than
expertise, my argument in this Article does not apply. Nevertheless, within
the asserted domain of expertise, the argument in Part II gives lawyers
peripheral roles. Lawyerly training may lead one to take center stage and
proclaim, “I come not to answer the question, but to problematize it!”219
But in the domain of expertise, that speech never takes center stage. It is
whispered from the wings if heard at all.
of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 652 n.265 (1990).
219. Which actually sounds more like a professor. A lawyer would say, “I come not to
answer the question, but to ask another, more to my liking.” See Jerry L. Mashaw, Law and
Engineering: In Search of the Law-Science Problem, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (2003)
(surveying the various ways in which lawyers and scientists diverge in their approaches to
problem solving). I think he overstates the compatibility of engineering with litigation, but
patent prosecution would be a good case for his thesis.
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Some lawyers, particularly academic lawyers, dislike the suggestion that
they might play Osric someday but never Hamlet. They insist that
problematizing is valuable, that they still have something to bring to the
table (and by implication that they still deserve a seat there), even if all they
have to offer is various arguments of the form “is that fair/says who?” True
enough. My point is comparative: within the domain of fairness, this sort
of argument may say most of what can be said, and lawyer-sophists—
philosophical or otherwise—may sit at the head of the table. Within the
domain of expertise, they sit farther down the table if they get a seat at all.
When a strong claim of expertise is made, they may find themselves
relegated to the children’s table and be told to be seen but not heard.
Assuming expert means for finding it (a big assumption, to be sure), the
aspiration to truth constrains rhetoric. When truth is the prime value and
expertise is adopted as the means of finding it then, as a practical matter,
lawyers either must conform to the narrow constraints of disinterested
expertise or insist that some other game must be played. That is roughly
what happened in the 1840s and 1850s, when patent agents and inventors
complained that examinations were too strict. Unhappy with having to
prove novelty, which at least in theory is an inquiry that takes the falsifiable
form of the assertion that a claimed invention has not been used or
disclosed before, advocates shifted the focus to inventors and their
aspirations. Rhetorically they succeeded in shifting from logos to pathos as
the primary mode of discourse. Logically the move had essentially nothing
to commend it, but the move gave lawyers and their clients more strategy
space. The resulting mess eventually provoked Commissioner Fisher’s
reaction—competitive examinations and a renewed emphasis on precision
and rigor—and a corresponding reduction in strategy space. As one might
have guessed by now, this cycle recurs predictably in the history of patent
law. It seems intrinsic to the process. To this day, patent prosecutors with
law degrees earn more than patent agents, and the differential wage reflects
incremental learning in legal rhetoric, not science. Indeed, the size of the
wage disparity is evidence of the degree to which the patent system cannot
be relied upon to allow applications based on scientific rather than legal
grounds.
To the extent this generalization is accurate, it implies three things. First,
within the domain of expertise, confidentiality will be a less important
value than accuracy, and lawyers’ assertions of confidentiality will be more
contested than they are in other domains. Rule 1.56 exemplifies this point,
as does the OTS’s displeasure with Kaye Scholer’s alleged attempt to
interpose itself between the OTS as regulator and Lincoln Savings as a
regulated entity.220 It is more common for disclosure obligations to target
220. E.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Lawyer Liability in Third Party Situations: The Meaning
of the Kaye Scholer Case, 26 AKRON L. REV. 395 (1993). The issues are surveyed in a
symposium in 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY (1998). Kaye Scholer pointed out that by the time it
showed up, the relationship between the OTS and Lincoln Savings had become adversarial;
Kaye Scholer was litigation counsel. Dennis E. Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions:
Kaye Scholer, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 S. CAL. L.
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clients rather than lawyers, but the relative point still holds. Where
disinterested expertise justifies regulation, the experts need something to
work with, which implies strong disclosure rules. It also implies that courts
should be more willing to entertain claims of selective waiver, which would
allow regulated companies to provide information to supposedly expert
regulators without feeding the frenzy of decidedly nonexpert civil
litigation.221 Lawyers who cannot shift the rhetorical ground and change
the game they have to play will be stuck with a relatively subservient role,
at least compared to lawyers who deal with private disputes or regulation
that is not justified by claims of expertise.
The second point might be called “Sperry’s revenge.” As we shift from
the domain of fairness to the domain of truth, we invite entry by any and all
truth producers, including programmers, economists, statisticians, and other
nonlawyers. The engineer’s claim to be better able to prosecute patents has
turned from a defensive protection of legacy rights to a tactical incursion
into work that used to be performed by lawyers. Even within nonexpert
domains, such as general litigation, much of the work may be expertised
and therefore made competitive. There is no reason to expect that trend to
change.
Finally, the prospect of disinterested expertise raises the question why
rules governing advocacy before tribunals would ever be concerned with
giving lawyers enough room to strut their stuff. Possibly there is no truth of
the matter, though then one wonders why a tribunal should be convened.
What is it supposed to do? Bizarre epistemologies may be espoused, and
the “standard model” of lawyering may accommodate them, but often they
are implausible on their face and they prove too much: if knowledge is so
elusive the cumbersome apparatus of a trial is pointless. Possibly there is a
truth, but no consensus exists on the means of ascertaining it. That happens
often enough, but it does not justify efforts to skew results within any
particular means, such as by sowing distrust of a truthful witness, or
engaging in rhetoric detached from any plausible relationship to the truth.
Any difference in practice may be assessed from either of the contrasting
perspectives. For most lawyers, it would be natural to ask why the PTO
imposes affirmative disclosure obligations—but it is equally fair to ask why
other tribunals do not. The administrative state has expanded over time,
bringing more and more subjects within the domain of claimed expertise;
there is no reason to expect that process to stop. This expansion invites
arguments about what lawyers do and should be allowed to do and about
how important truth is in comparison to other values. The process
complements other, more market-oriented changes that tend to put pressure
on traditional conceptions of what lawyers may and should do. As clients
REV. 985, 989 (1993) (noting—though not endorsing—Kaye Scholer’s argument). The
point in the text is that within the domain of disinterested expertise, that fact should not
matter.
221. See, e.g., DAVID MCGOWAN, DEVELOPING JUDGMENT ABOUT PRACTICING LAW 251–
52 (2d ed. 2013) (describing the rule against selective waiver); cf. Mila Sohoni, The Power to
Privilege, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 487 (2015).
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push from the market side, experts touting the primacy of truth over fairness
will do so from the government side. These complementary forces will
continue to exert pressure on lawyers to justify their methods in terms of
results rather than tradition.

